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ABSTRACT
How have labor market institutions and welfare-state transfers affected jobs and productivity in
Western Europe, relative to industrialized Pacific Rim countries?  Orthodox criticisms of European
government institutions are right in some cases and wrong in others.  Protectionist labor-market
policies such as employee protection laws seem to have become more costly since about 1980, not
through overall employment effects, but through the net human-capital cost of protecting senior male
workers at the expense of women and youth.  Product-market regulations in core sectors may also
have reduced GDP, though here the evidence is less robust. By contrast, high general tax levels have
shed the negative influence they might have had in the 1960s and 1970s.  Similarly, other institutions
closer to the core of the welfare state have caused no net harm to European jobs and growth. The
welfare state’s tax-based social transfers and coordinated wage bargaining have not harmed either
employment or GDP.  Even unemployment benefits do not have robustly negative effects.  
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  Western Europe’s productivity and employment performance has puzzled 
researchers for years.  Unemployment rates jumped in the 1970s, and remained high until 
the mid-1990s.  Since then the unemployment rates have eased but are still high.  
Meanwhile, labor productivity advanced as well in Western Europe as in the whole 
OECD until 1995, but then lagged.
i  In the search for explanations, most economists have 
focused on unemployment rates and a narrow range of variables, country experiences and 
time periods, with uncertain and non-robust results. 
  We believe that in the spirit of the new comparative economic history, a broader 
approach should be taken to these pressing issues, which involve the workings of entire 
national and regional economies.  In this paper, we search eclectically for tests and avoid 
discarding information.  While we take a broader empirical view, this paper does share a 
narrowness of the past literature’s view of contrasts between Europe and the Pacific-Rim 
OECD countries.  Like most writers, we focus here on possible flaws in institutions that 
prevail more in Europe, and not on possible flaws in other countries.  Thus in the trans-
Atlantic contrast, we shall ignore some areas where American institutions may well be 
inferior, such as health care, energy policy, or cell-phone service.  
  Our results contradict theories on the negative effects of the welfare state, and 
contain important messages about Europe’s productivity lag and the insider-outsider 
divide in rigid labor markets, which is gaining visibility in Europe.  Specifically, we find: 
 
  • Employee protection legislation (EPL) redistributes human capital formation 
away from youths and women to senior males. This shows up as a delayed loss in 
labor productivity rather than a net effect on jobs or unemployment.  
  • Product market regulations may have also reduced productivity, though this 
result is not yet robust.  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
  • Coordinated wage bargaining boosts productivity growth, presumably through 
its effects on wage moderation and macro-policy.  
  • Although tax wedges and transfer payments are often blamed for slow European 
job growth, we find that tax and transfer packages in high-spending welfare states 
have no clear cost in jobs or in productivity. Past studies showed negative effects 
because they failed to separate transitory from durable effects, and because some 
accepted theory as an empirical test. 
 
Our paper broadens the empirical debate in several ways. First, we examine effects on 
jobs and productivity together, which sheds extra light on both.  This is a crucial step 
missed by two past literatures: the labor-market literature on European unemployment, 
and the GDP-growth literature. We also combine institutions that have been considered 
separately in the labor market or growth literature. Finally, we offer new historical 
estimates of two labor-market institutions and new econometric tests, which point to a 
new reading of the verdicts on different institutional suspects. Past studies missed some 
of these verdicts by discarding fixed effects as mere control variables, when they in fact 
offer telling clues on the roles of different institutions. Our conclusions counter some of 
the recent pessimism about the usefulness of international macro-panel evidence. 
 
I. Two Court Trials That Should Be One 
 
A. Euro-jobs as victims 
  The debate over the causes of European unemployment has raged for a quarter 
century. In the 1960s, unemployment was considered a bigger problem in the United 
States, and many pointed to Europe’s central controls as the reason for its full 
employment. This view was dramatically reversed in the 1970s, and it soon became clear 
that the oil shocks alone could not explain the persistence of double-digit European 
unemployment rates through the 1980s and 1990s.
ii  Meanwhile, labor productivity grew 
faster in Europe up to 1995, and the popular view was that Europeans worked less than 
Americans, but almost as productively. In the early 21
st century, the job and productivity 
winds shifted. Unemployment stayed high in some European countries and dropped ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
below the United States and Japan in others; and flagging European productivity became 
a new concern. 
  Not surprisingly, the literature exploring the Euro-jobs issue is vast.
iii We 
introduce only a few strands, and the difficulties they have encountered in analyzing 
joblessness in the leading industrialized countries.  The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been at the center of research on comparative 
unemployment, providing the key data for investigating these issues and joining the 
policy debate. Its efforts have delivered a Washington Consensus package of policy 
conclusions: Europeans have lost their jobs to product and labor market rigidities, high 
tax rates on labor, and over-generous unemployment compensation and early retirement 
subsidies.
iv These orthodox conclusions emerged from ground-level observation of 
individual country programs, micro-econometric studies of labor supply behavior, and 
international macro-panel data on OECD countries from 1980 or earlier.  
Baker et al. (2005) and Freeman (2005) level serious criticisms at the OECD-
panel econometric literature. They suggest that OECD economists and others entered the 
statistical laboratory with biased glasses, possibly adjusting their institutional measures of 
employment protection, product market regulation, and openness to fit their prejudice. 
Baker et al. note that the same researchers downplayed their econometric findings that 
coordinated wage setting and active labor market policies have favorable job effects. 
They conclude that there is “a yawning gap between the confidence with which the case 
for labor market deregulation has been asserted and the evidence that the regulating 
institutions are the culprits.”
v Freeman calls for forsaking the macro-panel approach in 
favor of micro-economic studies of individual country labor markets.  
A key message of these studies and others is that econometric analysis on 
international panels is unlikely to yield clear answers. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) say 
a key reason for this failure is that the institutional variables are essentially fixed country 
effects which cannot explain the dramatic rise in European unemployment across the 
1970s and 1980s.
vi Heckman and Pagés (2004) express the same skepticism --  
 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
“The fragility of the macro-based estimates ... suggests one reason why relatively 
little is known about the impact of regulations in Europe, despite an abundance of 
cross-country time series papers analyzing policies in that region.”
vii 
 
B. Euro-GDP as Victim 
  In contrast, the literature on comparative economic growth is less agnostic about 
econometrics and more pessimistic about European institutions. In this literature, Western 
Europe lags behind North America for institutional reasons that overlap only partially 
with the labor-market institutions indicted in the unemployment literature. In the growth 
trial, the leading suspects are technology policy, telecommunications taxes and 
restrictions, education, taxes, the welfare state, restrictions on product-market 
competition, and policies toward big-box retail stores. Employee protection laws, 
coordinated wage bargaining and minimum wages receive little attention, even though 
authors who contrast European and American productivity would agree that these 
institutions are anti-growth.
viii  
  The only overlap between the two trials is taxes and welfare-state transfers. Just 
as the OECD and other critics blame unemployment compensation and taxes on labor for 
raising unemployment, the growth literature finds that some kinds of taxes and spending 
reduce GDP. The most persuasive study in this genre is Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell 
(1999), which classifies taxes by whether they discourage investments, and divides 
expenditures into uses that are productive (general public services, defense, education, 
health, housing, transport, communications) or unproductive (social benefits, recreation, 
“economic services”). Using macro-panels with attention to budget accounting 
constraints, the authors reach intuitively persuasive conclusions:  distortionary taxes (on 
income, payrolls, property) hurt growth if they finance unproductive expenditures, while 
non-distortionary taxes (on buying goods and services) do not: and productive 
government expenditures enhance growth, while unproductive ones do not.
ix Hence both 
suspects and victims in the unemployment and growth literatures are quite different. 
 
C. The Case for Merging the Trials ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
  Since these literatures have remained separate, both have failed to pursue some 
potentially decisive tests. Even though each set of accusations implies effects on both 
jobs and GDP, researchers have missed the chance to test the employment and 
productivity effects of each institution together. Intuition indicates that some institutions 
may retard both job creation and productivity, while others should raise one and reduce 
the other.
x Common sense also predicts that the effects should unfold with different time 
lags, allowing another opportunity for testing by exploring the two kinds of effects 
simultaneously.  
  The debate over employee protection legislation (EPL), which raises the costs of 
worker dismissal, illustrates the need to test for job and productivity effects together. 
Here, the unemployment literature has missed two kinds of chances. First, although 
theory argues that EPL creates insiders and outsiders, protecting the jobs of the former 
and reducing incentives to hire the latter, most writings have failed to quantify total and 
separate effects in this way, even though the marginal data cost is minimal.
xi Any study 
of EPL’s alleged job effects should not only estimate the impact on total jobs for insiders 
plus outsiders, but also estimate the effects on the two groups separately. 
  Exploring EPL’s separate effects on insiders and outsiders takes us through a 
doorway that was always open but seldom traversed in the Euro-jobs debate: the doorway 
to exploring EPL’s human capital and productivity consequences. Advocates of job 
protection have long asserted that EPL raises productivity by stabilizing jobs, in this case 
for protected “insiders”.  This leads them to accumulate human capital on the job, which, 
along with induced capital deepening, should raise GDP per worker or per hour.
xii  
However, strict EPL also denies new jobs to outsiders. This delays their human capital 
formation and reduces later productivity.  
  Which productivity effect dominates? The answer involves some dynamics, since 
the gains and losses in human capital have a different time path. The positive effects on 
insiders’ productivity begin as soon as a law protects their jobs. This effect can continue 
indefinitely, as new insiders replace retiring older ones. The negative effect on outsiders’ 
productivity, however, probably worsens over time before stabilizing on a per-capita 
basis. The longer that EPL denies work to outsiders, who are often young, female or 
immigrant job-seekers, the greater is their loss of human capital. This loss will persist ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
throughout the outsiders’ careers, even after they eventually become insiders; in fact, the 
job interruption literature suggests that they may never fully catch up.
xiii So the negative 
human-capital effects of EPL could rise over an adult career. To evaluate these 
contradictory effects on productivity over time, we propose a new test: can the negative 
productivity effects of exogenously tightening EPL rise for two or three decades? Our 
results suggest that they do, making the productivity effects of older, longer-standing 
EPL more negative than newly instituted protections.   
  Other institutions also affect both jobs and productivity in ways that allow extra 
testing of each leading hypothesis from labor or growth economics. Standard static 
reasoning says that any institutional or policy change that limits labor supply should raise 
productivity while it reduces jobs, simply because the static labor demand curve has a 
negative slope. That common presumption deserves to be tested: If generous 
unemployment compensation, taxes on labor earnings or higher minimum wages restrict 
labor supply, do they raise labor productivity as static theory suggests? A more optimistic 
theoretical model even suggests that more generous unemployment compensation will 
raise both labor productivity and long-run labor supply, if the extra safety nets replace 
missing private insurance markets and allow persons to take more productive risk.
xiv As 
these examples illustrate, competing views of the effects of institutions and policies have 
many testable implications about both job and productivity effects. 
 
II. Better Measures of Labor-Market Institutions -- and the History They Reveal 
 
“Explanations (of high unemployment) based solely on institutions also run 
however into a major empirical problem: many of these institutions were already 
present when unemployment was low .... Thus, while labour market institutions 
can potentially explain cross country differences today, they do not appear able to 
explain the general evolution of unemployment over time.”
xv 
 
  This concern voiced by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) has led to the view that 
since the institutional suspects antedate the onset of high unemployment and slow 
productivity growth in the 1970s, they cannot explain it. However, this view is based on ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
imperfect impressions of the longer history of labor-market institutions. Better measures 
of the main institutions show that some of the main suspects—strict EPL, generous 
unemployment compensation and high tax rates-- arrived on the scene just before 
European jobs and productivity growth began to suffer. Even if  the problems that began 
in the 1970s owed much to the oil shocks, the causal mechanisms cannot be uncovered 
without a correct charting of institutional history.  
 
A. Unemployment Compensation: The Net Reservation Wage Measure 
  “It is unfortunate that we have no comprehensive time series data on the 
coverage of the [unemployment compensation] system or on the strictness 
with which it is administered.” -- Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005)
xvi 
 
  To provide this more accurate institutional history, we start by offering improved 
measures back to 1950 of two key labor market institutions in OECD economies: the 
generosity of unemployment compensation and the strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL).
xvii  
  Unemployment compensation is clearly a work disincentive in the short run. How big 
a disincentive it is depends on three components of the generosity of unemployment 
compensation: 
 
  (a) the “replacement rate,” or (benefits per recipient) divided by (market wage), net 
of taxes; 
  (b) the eligibility of the unemployed for benefits, including requirements for job 
search and sanctions for non-compliance set out in national law; and 
  (c) the duration of coverage (6 months, 1 year, etc.). 
 
Many studies measuring unemployment compensation have focused on the replacement 
rate alone, omitting the other two components. Others consider duration, but still do not 
put the whole picture together for a long time span. We introduce estimates that 
incorporate all three components into a single measure of the “net reservation wage:” the ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
expected value of unemployment compensation as a percent of the median market wage 
after taxes.
xviii 
  The new picture of unemployment compensation charted in Figure 1 reveals 
important differences in the timing of more generous benefits. Benefits rose from 1967 in 
most of the core countries of the European Community, especially the Netherlands and 
Germany. These early increases antedate the post-1973 macro-shocks. Other countries 
escalated benefits after the first oil shock (Sweden in 1978, Denmark and Spain in 1985, 
and Italy in the mid-1990s). Generous unemployment benefits never reached Greece and 
Portugal, or the Pacific Rim countries besides New Zealand. Clearly, unemployment 
compensation differed in its timing as well as in long-run national averages.  
 
B. The Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation 
   
  Past studies have been restricted to a few limited snapshots of EPL due to lack of 
data
xix. This study draws on one author’s detailed reading of legislation through history, 
which was codified into an index of EPL strictness dating back to 1950. The new index 
reveals that job protection was neither fixed over time nor the same across countries. The 
view that strict EPL was already in place in the low-unemployment era before 1973 is 
incorrect except for Spain and Portugal, where firm EPL dates to the dictatorships of 
Franco and Salazar (but where democracy also brought greater job protection). Figure 2 
illustrates the differences in timing across countries since 1960. As with the dole, EPL 
rose at varying times and to different extents across countries; and strict EPL often 
antedated other institutional changes and poorer macro-performance by a few years. Italy 
was a leader, tightening protection for workers in formal sectors in the 1960s, three 
decades before it instituted generous unemployment benefits. France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands also tightened EPL in the years of union strength and full employment 
between 1967 and 1973. Other countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland built up their legal job defenses after the first oil shock hit. Since the mid-1980s 
EPL, like unemployment benefits, has hardly retreated for the OECD as a whole, and 
cross-country differences persist. 
 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
C. Other Institutions 
  The only labor-market institution that was already present when unemployment 
was low in the 1960s was coordinated wage bargaining, which brings large employer 
groups and organized labor together to negotiate wages and working conditions for most 
of the economy. Such bargains are outside of the ordinary functioning of decentralized 
markets and thus qualify as an interventionist institution, even when the government does 
not participate. To plot the history of coordinated wage bargaining, we use recent 
estimates by Ochel (2000).
xx Over the last four decades of the 20
th century, the nature of 
coordinated wage bargaining was stable for about half the OECD countries: some clung 
to coordination, and others consistently rejected it. In some cases coordinated bargaining 
broke down, the main examples being Spain and Portugal after the dictatorships, Britain 
in the Thatcher revolution, and New Zealand in 1990. In Scandinavia it weakened, yet 
did not collapse. In contrast, it strengthened in Ireland in the 1990s. For the OECD as a 
whole, there was very little trend in the degree of coordination.  
  Other government institutions rose gradually in importance, especially after the 
onset of the oil shocks. Tax rates and tax wedges on labor earnings followed the upward 
path noted in the generosity of unemployment compensation. Active labor market 
policies, such as subsidies for retraining and job search, rose later, from the mid-1980s. 
The only interventionist policy that tapered off was product market regulation, for which 
a seven-sector index developed by the OECD shows gradual declines since 1980.  
 
III. Better Tests 
 
  With improved institutional measures in hand, our next step is to expand the range 
of tests. We will concentrate on macro-panel tests in this and the next section despite the 
pessimism about the effectiveness of international macro-panels for judging national 
institutions. We agree that micro-studies for individual countries can yield important 
evidence if they draw on true policy experiments: and we cite such studies below. Yet 
better evidence can be squeezed from the international contrasts than recent authors have 
acknowledged.  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
  Our specifications of the determinants of international job and productivity 
performance differ from those in past studies. However, our most durable results do not 
depend on the details of variable inclusion or functional form. The main points emerge 
simply because we combine job and productivity determinants into a single system, we 
re-test with different periods and countries, and we re-interpret fixed effects that also 
showed up in other studies. 
 
A. The Basic Equation Set 
  We explore the effects of a common set of control variables and institutions on 
jobs, productivity, and growth using the following basic equation defined over j = (1, ..., 
J) countries and t = (1, ..., T) time periods: 
 
(1)  Yjt = ßk Xkjt  +  ujt, 
 
where the Y’s are the job and productivity variables to be explained, the Xk’s are k 
identified influences on the Y’s, and the ujt’s are the error terms. The choice of 
behavioral X’s should envelope competing theories. The X’s can be instrumented or not, 
and can have time lags or not. The choices of X’s depend on data availability, as do the 
countries and time periods. To reduce serial correlation, we use three-year averages as the 
time dimension of each observation. More complete data permits us to span the 
1963/1965 – 1999/2001 period in a single set of equations. However, for the following 
discussion we split that long span into two overlapping samples (1963/1965 – 1978/1980 
and 1978/1980 – 1999/2001) due to structural shifts that will not be difficult to interpret.  
  The independent influences (Xk’s) on jobs, productivity, and growth are 
summarized in Table 1. The dependent variables are the five job outcomes, four 
productivity and GDP outcomes, and one growth rate listed at the top of the table. Next 
come some control variables often used in the literature. For most equations the lagged 
dependent variable must be included, since the behavior of jobs and productivity depends 
strongly on influences that also influenced the previous period’s jobs and productivity. 
One can deal with this feedback in various familiar ways, including first differencing. 
One of these differencing approaches is the simple growth equation in the middle ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
column. We will not explore complete first differencing here, since we will argue that the 
fixed country effects that differencing is designed to finesse often contain vital 
information for judging institutions.  
  The other control variables are familiar. The lagged term for GDP per capita 
relative to the United States, a proxy for catching-up potential, will have the effects one 
expects from the growth convergence literature: a poorer recent past lowers current 
productivity but raises the growth rate. Educational attainment is a familiar source of 
productivity, though its influence is sometimes obscured in our regressions by the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. The age shares of the very young and very old 
also have familiar effects on employment and productivity. 
  Aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks strongly affect jobs and 
productivity in all studies. Those shocks can be national or global, and macroeconomists 
proxy them in various ways. We take a cautious approach, capturing key influences while 
minimizing risk of simultaneity bias. We proxy aggregate demand shocks with OECD-
wide inflation minus unemployment, and aggregate supply shocks with the familiar 
“misery index,” the sum of inflation and unemployment at the same global level.  ￿  
  Next Table 1 lists the institutional and budgetary variables at the center of the 
debates over Euro-jobs and Euro-growth. Product market institutions and policies are 
represented by the OECD index of product-market regulation, and by the Freedom House 
index of business leaders’ opinions on the openness of the country’s markets. The OECD 
regulation index covers seven basic sectors (airlines, telecommunications, electricity, gas, 
post, rail, and road freight), but omits sectors that have stood out in recent technological 
advances, such as retailing. Arguably these omitted sectors grew faster in the United 
States than in Europe because of European regulations on land use and work hours. The 
Freedom House measure of openness seems appropriate here since it tries to capture 
policy and not geography. However, this variable explains little because it has been 
almost constant in the OECD countries since the 1970s.  
  We use the long reach of our new EPL estimates to capture the possible dynamics 
of employment protection laws. As conjectured above, EPL may save jobs and encourage 
productivity in the first few years, when it protects working-aged men and increases their 
human capital. However, it could cost jobs and productivity later, as the share of ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
unprotected youths and women in the labor force rises. To explore the dynamics and test 
for the durable net effects, we use just one level of lagged EPL and a couple of changes 
in EPL. The level is the oldest, with a 12-year lag.  
  Next comes the Ochel index of coordination in functional forms designed to test 
some ideas in the literature. One idea dating back at least to Calmfors and Driffil (1988) 
is that wage-setting coordination has a U-shaped effect on jobs. It promotes employment 
at the two extremes, when bargaining is either fully decentralized or centralized; while 
semi-coordinated bargaining is predicted to cost jobs.
xxii We can test this, and also test 
whether EPL and coordinated bargaining, which both pursue stable jobs and costs, are 
substitutes or complements.  
  The conventional view on budgetary policies is that any higher taxes or transfers 
cut jobs, and some of them reduce productivity as well. The main budgetary suspects are 
tax rates on productive labor and subsidies to the unemployed. As prominent as this 
suspicion is, surprisingly few studies test for a familiar corollary: The output loss from a 
tax wedge or a non-work subsidy should increase non-linearly. Perhaps this frequent 
oversight is another casualty of emphasizing job effects at the expense of output effects. 
The corollary can be tested, and we use cubic functions to explore the differences in the 
effects of consecutive tax or transfer increases of the same size.  
  In addition to the total tax burden and unemployment compensation, we explore 
the effects of the tax and spending mix. On the tax side, we follow the shares of income 
and property tax and consumption taxes, and omit social security contributions. On the 
expenditure side, we follow the share of social transfers and omit non-social expenditures 
plus net budget surplus minus non-tax revenue.  
 
B. Durable and Transitory Influences  
  As some theories hint, we should be prepared for the possibility that a particular 
kth independent variable Xk has different slopes for its durable influence (call it Xkd) 
and its transitory residual (xkjt). That kind of split is important whenever behavior reacts 
differently to durable and transitory influences, as in Milton Friedman’s permanent 
income hypothesis of the consumption function. Therefore we prefer this generalization 
of the basic equation: ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
 
(2)  Yjt  =  Bk xkjt  +  Ak Xkd  + ujt. 
 
Sometimes researchers are lucky, and find that the two component parts of Xkjt have the 
same coefficients, so that each Bk = Ak = ßk, yielding the usual kind of panel equation in 
Equation (1): Yjt = ßk Xkjt + ujt.  Yet that is not the case in recent OECD experience, so 
we need to distinguish durable from transitory effects. 
  Durable influences pose an econometric challenge. The estimation task gets 
complicated if the durable influences (Ak Xkd) behave like linear combinations of 
conventional fixed place binaries and fixed time binaries, as with the budgetary variables 
here. When this happens, Equation (2) behaves like 
 
(3) Yjt =  Bk xkjt  +  Ckj Xkj  +  Dkt Xkt  +  Uj  +  Vt  +  ejt 
 
where the Bs, Cs and Ds are coefficients, the Xkj’s are fixed country profiles of the 
durable influences, the Xkt’s are fixed time profiles of the durable influences, Uj and Vt 
are vectors of coefficients on conventional place and time binaries, and ejt is the new 
error term. A serious identification problem will loom in this case, because the durable 
behavioral influences (Xkj and Xkt) will be linear combinations of the conventional fixed 
effect binaries. We cannot separately estimate Xkj and Uj, or  Xkt and Vt.  We return to 
this complication in a later section, after we examine the results from omitting 
conventional fixed effects in the spirit of Equation (2).  
  To underline the important difference between durable effects (Ak Xkd) and 
transitory effects (Bk xkjt) and their problematic relationship to conventional fixed 
effects, consider an analogy to the econometrics of the familiar consumption function. 
Suppose that we had data on the consumption, income, and other attributes of 500 people 
in a panel of 10 years, and we were asked to estimate what a permanent income gain 
would do to consumption. The permanent income hypothesis or the similar life-cycle 
hypothesis teach us that the marginal propensity to consume is much higher when income 
is permanently raised than when it is raised only one year. Yet the standard approach to 
pooled estimation throws in fixed effects for individuals or places plus fixed time effects ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
and then discards them, reporting only the slope with respect to transitory changes. In the 
consumption function case, that would amount to hiding the long-run marginal propensity 
to consume of perhaps 0.9, and then presenting the transitory slope of perhaps 0.2 as the 
predicted effect of raising income permanently. The usual way of hiding the more durable 
effect is to shorten the regression table by simply indicating whether or not fixed effects 
were added to the equation. Yet fixed effects are often the closest approximation to the 
effects of durable influences that could be proxied by long-run moving averages. This 
difference, as we shall see, matters greatly to the debate over European institutions. We 
return to it when confronting the possible role of fixed effects in the international macro-
estimates of job and productivity determinants.  
 
IV. Revealed Impacts on Euro-Jobs and Euro-Productivity, 1978-2001 
 
A. The Basic Verdicts  
  Our international macro-panel tests, approached on these terms, offer new insights 
on which institutions matter and which do not. Although we encounter some of the 
ambiguities that have bothered past authors, eclecticism offers a net gain in the end, once 
we have presented slightly better tests, separated durable from transitory influences, 
extended the time perspective, and visited other countries. We begin with the same data 
period as most studies, starting from 1980 and ending in 2001, the latest year for OECD 
data on social expenditures. We display results only for the instrumented version of each 
equation, since the choice between IV and single-equation estimates had no effect on the 
signs or general magnitudes of the institutional effects.
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  Of the dependent variables introduced in Table 1, we focus in this section on six 
key measures of job and output performance.
xxiv We do not focus on the unemployment 
rate, which has dominated the labor-market literature. It has the drawback of giving equal 
weight to two labor transitions that are unequal in importance: the key transition between 
being employed and being inactive, and the transition between two inactive states, 
namely being in or out of the registered labor force. To focus on the first transition, and 
to link to the results on labor productivity, we follow the gross employment ratio for the 
15-64 population. Later we look at unemployment rates for demographic subgroups.  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
  Control variables. Before turning to the featured institutional effects, we note that 
the control variables in Table 1 performed as expected. The strongest influence was the 
lagged dependent variable, whose coefficient was always between one-half and one. It 
should never be dropped from the equation, nor replaced with first differencing. A related 
dynamic variable is the catch-up variable, this country’s income gap behind the United 
States ten years earlier. As expected, backwardness raised the growth rate of GDP per 
capita, but it had no clear effect employment or productivity levels.  
  The only non-performer among the control variables is educational attainment of 
the adult labor force. It proved insignificant in productivity and growth equations, 
probably because its gradual effect is eclipsed by the lagged dependent variable and the 
catch-up variable.  
  Having large shares of old or young population dragged down employment, 
productivity, and GDP growth, presumably because middle age groups are more 
productive.  
  Another strong set of control variables, the OECD-wide shocks to aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply, performed as expected. Strong demand raised jobs, 
productivity, output, and the growth rate, and bad supply shocks (here meaning the oil 
shocks) cut jobs, productivity, output, and growth.  
  The results for institutions and budgetary policies are illustrated with test statistics 
on some very large institutional increments in Table 2.
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  Product market regulations. While European governments have retained most of 
their job protection, unemployment compensation, and high taxes, they have been 
steadily dismantling their product market regulations since 1980. In fact, all 21 core 
OECD countries have followed this path. The top row in Table 2 suggests that this 
movement boosted output per employed person or per labor hour everywhere, possibly 
by large amounts. The average OECD country cut product market regulations by a little 
over two points (on a 0-6 scale) since 1980, which should have raised GDP per worker or 
per hour by more than one percent each initial three years, or by up to 10 percent over the 
whole sample period, once one reckons in the feedback through the lagged dependent 
variable. Plausible as this result may seem, we think the true unit effects of de-regulation 
in product markets may be both larger and smaller than our coefficients show. Larger, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
because the OECD measures of product market regulations cover only seven sectors 
(airlines, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight), missing the 
effects of deregulation in other sectors. Smaller, because other plausible specifications of 
the same equations do not show the strong significance of the product-regulation variable 
that is shown in Table 2. Deregulation probably did help growth throughout the OECD, 
but the evidence is not yet robust.  
  A related product-market institution, trade policy, did not show significant effects 
because it was not given a chance to do so in this era. Trade policy (not shown in Table 
2) did not differ much over time or across these 21 countries since 1980.  
  Job Protection Laws (EPL). The debate over European jobs has devoted attention 
to the charge that EPL costs jobs and raises unemployment. Our estimates suggest a 
possible negative net effect on jobs, but one that could easily be zero. Our null result 
matches the conclusion on this issue by Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005): “evidence 
that they [EPLs] have a decisive impact on overall rates of unemployment is mixed, at 
best.”
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  As we hinted earlier, EPL has had clearer effects on productivity, especially with 
a 12-year lag. Interestingly, that effect depends on whether the country uses coordinated 
wage bargaining as an alternative job protection device. Table 2 presents two sets of 
results on EPL, one for countries with little or no wage coordination, and one for 
countries with closely coordinated wage setting. In the no-coordination context, increased 
job protection did not seem to reduce productivity. This may be because the extra job 
protection was implemented where protection was initially low, so that it protected a 
large number of relatively productive insiders while delaying the careers of very few 
outsiders, yielding positive net effects on productivity.  Examples would be the American 
protections against collective dismissal under Reagan and Bush in 1988-1989, and similar 
modest initial increases in job protections in Canada 1984-1985 or Australia 1992-1993. 
By contrast, in contexts of strong wage coordination, extra EPL lowers productivity 
significantly. In these settings, EPL was older and the negative effects on productivity 
had time to appear.  One example was Ireland in the decades after EPL was tightened in 
1977-1978.  Another was Spain after the end of the Franco era, in the dozen years when ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
new power and security for insiders coincided with lingering coordination that in fact did 
little to moderate wages.   
  Coordination in wage bargaining. Even though OECD jobs studies played down 
the effects of coordinated wage setting, many econometric studies show that it had a 
positive effect on jobs. We get a similar positive result, with two significant changes: 
Coordination’s positive effect seems to be on productivity rather than on jobs, and it 
appears to be strongest in economies where workers get relatively little protection from 
EPL. Thus coordination in wage bargaining affects our productivity and output growth 
results as strongly as it affected employment results in past studies.
xxvii Its positive role 
particularly fits the fuller and more secure employment achieved without strict EPL in the 
late 1990s in Ireland, and to a lesser extent in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
xxviii  
  How can that be? While the sources of gains from coordination are not yet 
quantified, scholars have identified channels through which it could raise productivity 
over time. Coordination spawns wage moderation, which may tame sectoral rent-seeking 
and rent-sharing with job security. The consensus it builds can also cut the personnel 
costs of supervising workers.
xxix It may facilitate stable macro-policy by promoting 
trust.
xxx  
  The favorable effects of coordination (presumably with wage moderation) are so 
strong that in combination with stricter EPL they significantly raise productivity. This 
would explain the “double jump” test statistics in the middle rows of Table 2. Again, the 
GDP gain seems to come mainly through productivity, suggesting the need for deeper 
research into how such institutional packages affect human capital formation over the 
longer run.  
  Unemployment compensation. To explore budget-related institutions, we must 
use the distinction between durable and transitory effects described above. Employment 
and productivity seem to react very differently to the durable and transitory components 
of unemployment compensation rules, taxes and transfers. The regressions confirmed this 
difference, which probably has two explanations. One is that optimizing employers and 
members of the labor force perceive the difference between durable and temporary 
changes in taxes and transfers.  The other source is econometric: No amount of 
instrumenting seems to remove all short-run cyclical effects from tax and transfer shares ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
of GDP.  We therefore explore the durable influences of fiscal variables (the Xkd’s), and 
omit transitory elements (Xkjt’s) from the underlying equations. The durable effects can 
be represented by countries’ sample averages of the relevant fiscal parameters, since 
these parameters tended to stay on a plateau in the 1978/1980-1999/2001 sample.  
  For this post-1980 period, the effects of more generous unemployment 
compensation tend to be negative, as expected. The slopes shown in Table 2 reveal that 
raising benefits reduces employment and overall GDP somewhat at the bottom and top of 
the range of benefit generosity experienced in the OECD.  Starting with essentially zero 
benefits, as in Italy in 1979, the first introduction of unemployment compensation cuts 
GDP slightly.  Then across the more typical middle ranges, with unemployment 
compensation at about 15 percent of median wage, offering more support to the 
unemployed has no clear effect.  At the high end, such as the 31 percent support ratio 
offered in Belgium in 1982, more compensation reduces jobs and (probably) GDP.  
While the effects tend to be negative, they are not dramatically large.  Probably the main 
reason for this is a simple point highlighted by the new estimates of the generosity of 
unemployment benefits: The benefits did not cause large drops in employment because 
those benefits were never greater than a third of a median wage for production workers.    
  Broader fiscal shifts. The effects of higher tax and transfer rates for the economy 
as a whole, in contrast, departed sharply from conventional wisdom.  The “broader fiscal 
shift” rows of Table 2 show that higher tax and expenditure rates actually raised 
employment and output, whether the extra taxes were spent entirely on social transfers or 
on all kinds of expenditures in fixed proportions.  The only exception is the negative 
effect on productivity per hour from raising taxes above 45 percent of GDP, as in 
Belgium in 1985.   
  As previous scholars have noted, this seldom-announced positive result should 
not seem strange, once one factors in both sides of the government budgets.
xxxi Sustaining 
higher taxes and spending may not drag down growth in the context of the high-budget 
welfare states, which have some of the world’s least corrupt governments. Since much of 
the extra public expenditure is spent on efficiency-building public health, public 
education and infrastructure, it outweighs the GDP costs of transfers like early-retirement 
subsidies or unemployment compensation. It also seems likely that some of the ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
productivity gain comes from the stronger demand-smoothing effect of automatic 
stabilizers in the higher-budget countries.   
  Different effects for different worker groups. Many labor market institutions, 
particularly those that raise the costs of turnover, could affect the employment of 
different groups in diverse ways. The laws separating protected and unprotected workers 
could boost the pay and productivity of protected insiders at the expense of outsiders. In 
particular, many institutions benefit the jobs and pay of males over 25 at the expense of 
females and youth (here 15-24) in the labor force. The differential employment effects 
can be tested for
xxxii by examining the the outsider/insider ratios of unemployment rates, 
with women and youth as the outsider groups. We choose unemployment rates rather 
than employment ratios because the employment ratio measures are complicated by 
school enrollment (especially for the young) and other influences on female labor force 
participation.  
  The clearest result, shown in Table 3, is that EPL strongly redistributes 
unemployment toward women and youth, to the advantage of males over 25. As 
conjectured earlier, this insider/outside difference is one reason why the effects of EPL 
might be positive when it is first instituted, and negative later on. When first 
implemented, EPL protects a large share of the labor force and may do no net damage to 
on-the-job skill formation. With the passage of time, however, a rising share of workers 
spends a longer time queuing for protected jobs, causing a net drop in human capital.  
Table 3 supports this story: where EPL is stricter, outsiders have higher unemployment 
rates. 
  Other institutions have mixed effects on female and youth unemployment.  A 
country with strict product market regulations seems to discourage female employment 
and help youth, for unknown reasons.  Closer wage coordination has the opposite 
tendency.  The combination of strong EPL and wage coordination still shifts 
unemployment to outsiders, so that the discriminatory effect of EPL outweighs the more 
equal treatment implied by wage coordination. Table 3 seems to show that more generous 
unemployment compensation favors employment of outsiders, but the result should be 
read through its male denominator: Unemployment compensation allows more males 
over 25 to be officially unemployed.  Finally, raising taxes in general seems to shift ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
unemployment toward youth, perhaps because social security taxes raise the cost of an 
initial hire.   
  If the insider-outsider effect of EPL is so strong, it should show up in the raw 
data, and not just in multivariate regressions. It does, both in the broad movements over 
time and in the differences across countries.  It was in the 1970s that unemployment 
became dramatically higher for youth and women, relative to men.  This timing correlates 
with the rise in EPL, and the shift toward unemployed women and youth was stronger in 
the high-EPL Mediterranean and Belgium than elsewhere.  Today’s international pattern 
shows the likely link to EPL even more clearly.  Table 4 contrasts the loci of 
unemployment in highly protective Italy and Greece with the pattern in less protective 
Ireland and Denmark.  The unemployment-rate ratios tilt more strongly toward the young 
and women in the two high-EPL Mediterranean countries, in a way that was much less 
true before the rise in Mediterranean EPL. The strongest conclusion so far is that 
employee protection laws clearly redistribute jobs toward males over 25 at the expense of 
others.   
 
B. Some Suspects Not Featured Here, and Why Not  
  Not all institutions can be analyzed here, for varying reasons. The closest near 
miss is the mix of tax types within the over tax bill. We did test for differences in jobs 
and productivity caused by shifts among three tax categories: consumption taxes, social 
security payroll deductions, and income plus property taxes. We did not find robust 
results, however, so that any hunches about the merits of consumption taxation must 
remain hunches.
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  Despite a determined effort to include the effects of active labor market policies 
(ALMPs), we have still been unable to pin down their effects from such a panel.  The 
basic reason is that we could not reliably separate ALMP policies from the cyclically 
sensitive outlays associated with them. We note the optimism about such activist policies 
in the recent literature, but cannot confirm or reject it here.
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  Some other leading suspects escape trial for want of sufficient data.  So it was 
with minimum wage laws, early retirement subsidies, the productivity revolution in 
retailing, and research and development policies. ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
 
C. Those Vexed Fixed Effects (UFOs) 
Institutional results for all studies of European employment are strongly affected 
by the inclusion or exclusion of conventional time or country fixed effects.  The usual 
practice is to hide these effects behind rows that simply indicate whether unidentified 
fixed effects are included.  We feel this is a mistake in settings where the real influences 
are durable rather than transitory, as in the recent history of jobs and growth in the 
OECD. Recall from Equation (3) above that the durable behaviors can be linear 
combinations of the coefficients of those binaries by time and place, posing a tough 
problem of interpretation. A researcher must decide: Do I select linear combinations of 
binary fixed effects that capture durable forces at work in the economy (the Xkd’s) or do 
I use the standard approach, adding J-1 fixed place effects and T-1 fixed time effects to 
the regression? 
  In the name of reserving judgment, economists have chosen the latter path, and 
have thrown away information. The usual fixed-effects interpretation reveals a belief in 
mysterious UFOs (unidentified fixed objects), which are presented as though they were 
forces known to be separate from the X’s. But what are they?  Is there no hope of finding 
what lies behind them?  We press this issue with Table 5 and Figure 3.   
  Table 5 shows that the UFOs so often used but so seldom displayed in other 
studies correlate strongly with the country-average components of some variables but not 
others.  For our 1978-2001 sample, country fixed effects correlate strongly and positively 
with big government (the total tax share) in all job, productivity, and growth equations. 
One can even run regressions with the country UFOs as a dependent variable explained 
by the tax share and a few other Xkd’s, and get suggestive. Doing so is a big first step 
toward endogenizing the UFOs. Experimenting with such regressions in fact gives us 
back the main conclusions featured in connection with Table 2.
xxxv  
  Figure 3 dramatizes the same point by comparing the fixed country effects for the 
log of GDP per person with the share of all taxes in GDP. The usual way of presenting 
fixed-effect binaries implies that something unexplained about Sweden and Japan made 
Sweden’s GDP per person 56% higher than Japan’s, other things equal; yet the usual 
presentation invites us to think that this 56% advantage is unrelated to Sweden’s high ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
taxes or welfare transfers, which already entered the same regression equation. Sweden’s 
UFO also pushes Sweden’s GDP per person 39% above that of the United States, which 
tends to be a favorable outlier in the international spectrum.  
  How should people interpret such striking patterns? Attributing them to separate 
“unobservable” forces seems inadequate. We recommend viewing such patterns as 
revealing information that researchers should have featured all along: The durable effects 
of institutional packages are often captured in the fixed effects, and are quite different 
from the transitory coefficients that economists pursue and announce. Focusing on the 
durable effects corresponds with the kind of question that motivated our research: What 
would happen if an institution were durably changed, and not reversed the next year? 
  We interpret the differences caused by fixed binary effects as follows: 
 
  (1) The correct provisional results are those already presented in Table 2, without 
conventional binary fixed effects. 
  (2) Adding the conventional UFOs yields fixed-place coefficients that mix true 
unobservables with large doses of durable effects from such variables as the welfare state 
high-tax nexus.  So the correlations of Table 5 and figure 3 suggest.  Their positive 
effects for welfare states partly reflect the productivity-raising features of the welfare 
state, such as more efficient health care and support for mothers’ careers.
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  (3) Offsetting these positive effects of the larger-budget, larger-transfer nexus are 
equally negative coefficients for transitory effects of extra taxes and (especially) 
transfers, in the underlying fixed-effect regressions.  We interpret these negative 
transitory effects as showing the effect of nation-specific and time-specific cyclical 
macro-shocks, which could not be distilled out in any clear way.  In other words, what 
some studies found to be negative effects of taxes-minus-transfers on growth are due to 
positive effects in the reverse direction.   
 
  Thus researchers using panel data face a hard choice between conventional binary 
fixed effects (UFOs) and selecting only those fixed effects that are durable behavioral 
influences, such as a country’s long-lasting labor laws.  Which choice is correct depends 
on the historical setting.  Most panel studies assume that the durable and transitory forms ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
of behavior have the same slope, so that the UFOs represent only separate forces that 
deserve to be kept out of the limelight.  If the researchers are lucky, that assumption will 
be true.  Yet the task of judging institutions in OECD countries is not such a case.  The 
fixed effects probably reflect durable influences of the variables already entered into the 
equation.  Only a broader and more eclectic weighing of the evidence allows us to decide.   
 
V. A Deeper History: How the 1960s-1970s Were Different 
 
  Institutional influences on employment and growth appear to evolve over time, 
and we have begun to suggest some reasons why.  To track this evolution, we compare 
the results summarized above with those from a similar panel for 19 countries over six 
three-year periods, 1963/1965-1978/1980.
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  For this earlier period, like the recent one just summarized, control variables 
explained most of the temporal changes in employment and productivity. The shocks to 
aggregate demand and supply, especially the oil shocks, account for much of the change 
from 1973 on. Lagged dependent variables and age variables also played the same strong 
roles as in the later era.   
  The institutional effects, however, seem to have been evolving. The contrasts 
between Table 6’s test statistics for the 1960s-1970s are quite different from those we 
reviewed for the later era in Table 2.
xxxviii  
  Before 1980, employee protection laws did not seem to have the negative effects 
they have delivered since 1980. Whether stricter EPL had a positive effect depended on 
whether the tightening occurred in a context of coordinated wage bargaining.  Without 
coordinated settlements, tighter EPL may have had no clear effects within this time 
period.  With coordination, tightening EPL seems to have had positive effects on jobs and 
GDP over the 1960s and 1970s, even though it eventually dragged down productivity, as 
shown in Table 2 above.  Combining strict EPL with coordinated wage-setting worked 
well in Scandinavia in these early years. 
  We tentatively interpret EPL’s effects over time in terms of the insider-outsider 
model and the career cycle. In the 1960s-1970s, EPL was new in most of Western 
Europe, except on the Iberian peninsula. It protected a large share of workers and initially ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
denied work to relatively few outsiders, so the job effect was positive during cyclical 
shocks, and productivity was not yet compromised.  As the century wore on, however, 
the outsider share of the labor force kept growing.  The favorable job effect and the net 
effect on human capital were overwhelmed by the negative effects on outsiders’ careers, 
yielding the negative effects in Tables 2 and 3.   
  On the fiscal front, the 1960s-1970s results differ from the fiscal effects in the 
post-1980 era. Raising unemployment compensation from zero to low levels promoted 
jobs and productivity in the way predicted by the Sinn (1995) model. General fiscal 
expansion, on the other hand, had negative effects in the bottom and top budget ranges, 
while its effect on the heavily represented middle range could have any sign. We offer no 
explanation why raising taxes and spending had a negative effect on results for the 1960s-
1970s, yet lacked any clear negative effect in other plausible specifications for these same 
decades or for the period after 1980.
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VI. A Wider World: Evidence beyond the OECD 
 
  To avoid passing up relevant information, the debate over Europe’s jobs and 
growth should look beyond the OECD to other countries where restrictive labor laws are 
in place.  Although Europe’s high transfers are not matched elsewhere, costly dismissals 
for senior workers or high minimum wages are also found in Latin America, Southern 
Africa and India. The spirit of the new comparative economic history calls on the OECD 
debate to consider this wider evidence, which, as in Europe, spans all of the economist’s 
usual micro- and macro-tests.  
  For Latin America and the Caribbean, institutions that make labor markets less 
flexible seem to have reduced formal-sector employment and output, as in Western 
Europe since about 1980. The institutions are not always as focused on preventing layoffs 
as in Europe, but they are similar enough to offer strong suggestions for the European 
debate. Latin American and Caribbean experience, like the OECD over the last quarter 
century, shows that EPL has lowered formal sector employment, mainly for women and 
youths.
xl  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
  Chilean experience offers a particularly good laboratory for testing the effects of 
changes in labor laws, thanks to annual surveys of Santiago spanning four decades that 
included sharp reversals in labor market policy.  The costs of dismissal were sharply 
raised in 1966, slashed by Pinochet in 1974, and raised in 1985 and 1991.  Real minimum 
wages stagnated in relation to average wages over last four decades of the 20th century, 
except in the mid-1970s, when the minimum/average ratio was raised sharply (average 
wages were held down while the minimum rose, an un-Chicago result).  Surveys of about 
300,000 workers in Santiago showed that tightening job security raised employment for 
prime working-aged males and reduced employment for women and youths, as in the 
OECD experience.
xli   
  A study of responses to two increases in Brazil’s dismissal costs confirms that job 
tenure for  youths and women declined relative to males aged 25 and older. Gonzaga 
(2003) used about 500,000 job records from six cities between 1982 and 2002, when the 
costs of dismissing workers rose twice (the1988 Constitution and a September 2001 law), 
within  the  context  of  a  complicated  government-run  severance  fund  system.    A 
differences-in-differences analysis shows that men over 25 gained in job tenure relative 
to women and youths, even though the net effect on total jobs is unclear.
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  For India and Southern Africa, the effects are more broadly negative, even when 
measured as contemporaneous net effects on employment and productivity. Besley and 
Burgess (2004) trace the effects of 28 changes in India’s labor market institutions, most 
of which involved raising the cost of layoffs. These changes reduced jobs, output and 
productivity, and raised poverty.
xliii Labor market restrictions similarly seem to account 
for much of Zimbabwe’s unemployment since independence.
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VII. Two Kinds of Verdicts 
 
  This paper demonstrates how eclecticism in pursuing evidence pays off by 
delivering clearer verdicts than a narrower empirical exercise might have yielded.  Our 
wider range of tests brings us to two different kinds of verdicts, familiar from American 
trial law: reasonable-doubt verdicts and preponderance-of-evidence verdicts.   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
  The reasonable-doubt rule, as practiced in American criminal cases, makes it 
harder to rule against a defendant (here, institutions). If some evidence doesn’t fit, we 
must acquit. Robustness is one econometric translation of the reasonable-doubt yardstick. 
Only one of our conclusions delivers this demanding a verdict against any of Europe’s 
debated labor-market or fiscal institutions. This verdict is that employee protection laws 
have created labor-market insiders and outsiders as portrayed by Lindbeck and Snower 
(2001),
xlv reducing employment and earning power for women and youths relative to 
males over 25.   
  However, our eclectic body of evidence has yielded several preponderance-of-
evidence verdicts.
xlvi The preponderance of evidence suggests that the effects of 
employee protection laws on employment and GDP have become less positive and more 
negative over time.  When first instituted, EPL can boost employment without 
compromising productivity, as in the 1960s-1970s era.  Over time, however, the 
employment gain evaporates as outsiders become a rising share of the labor force. At the 
same time, negative productivity effects creep in, as a declining share of the whole work 
force’s career history is spent as protected insiders. Product market regulations also 
appear guilty of lowering productivity, though the evidence against them still leaves 
reasonable doubts.  By the 1980s-1990s unemployment compensation had also drifted 
toward the negative effect predicted by theory.  
  Other institutions are acquitted, even on the preponderance of evidence criterion. 
Coordinated wage setting seems to have very positive job and productivity effects. And 
the overall bundle of welfare state transfers shows no negative effects on either jobs or 
output, at least not since 1980.   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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!￿￿ Heckman and Pagés 2004, p. 2. 
!￿￿￿ To survey the growth literature, see Bassanini et al. 2001; Blanchard, “Future,” 2004; Gordon 2004; and 
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2001. 
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Kahn 2005. ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿ A classic statement is Freeman and Medoff 1984. 
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 ￿! Sinn 1995, 1996, Agell 1999. 
 ! Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, p.C2. Similarly, Blanchard, “Explaining,” 2004, p. 3: “European labor 
market institutions did not come into being in the early 1970s. For the most part, both the architecture and 
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 !￿ Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel 2005, p. 4. 
 !￿￿ Allard 2003, 2005. 
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that of Lazear 1990.   
   Ochel 2000. 
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considerably greater weight than any other country in the OECD-wide averages for inflation and 
unemployment.  
  ￿￿ Calmfors and Driffil 1988. A similar idea is presented by Freeman 1998.  
  ￿￿￿ For the first-stage instrruments used in the IV variant, see Appendix A. 
  ￿! To focus on the most meaningful conclusions about institutional impacts, Tables 2, 3, and 6 present 
results based primarily on test statistics for linear combinations of coefficients, rather than on single 
coefficients. For a few of the original regressions from the 1978/1980-1999/2001 sample, see Appendix B. 
  ! We caution that Tables 2, 3, and 6 will display very large increments in institutions and budgetary 
policies for rhetorical purposes. Such jumps never actually occurred from one three-year period to the next, 
even though all the institutional combinations actually occurred in the sample. The counterfactuals shown 
in these tables violate the “speed limit” for counterfactuals described in Lindert 2004, vol. 2, pp. 29-30. 
  !￿ Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel 2005, p. 10. For a similar conclusion, see Addison and Teixeira 2001. 
  !￿￿ Baker et al. 2005, and the studies cited there. 
  !￿￿￿ Auer 2000. 
  ￿  Gordon 1994, Teulings and Hartog 1998. 
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   ￿ See, for example, Helms 1985, Atkinson 1999, and Lindert 2004, Chapters 10 and 18. Kneller et al. 
1999 results agreed with this statement regarding higher taxes spent on government purchases, but not 
regarding higher taxes for transfer spending.  
   ￿￿ See, in particular, Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 2001 and 2005. Some of their tests trace the effects of 
unionization rather than the institutions emphasized here, but unionization rates and these institutions are 
sufficiently correlated to make the results comparable.   
   ￿￿￿ Clearer results were announced by Kneller et al. 1999, as noted earlier. Yet we prefer our regression 
specification, and could not confirm their results with our chosen equations.   
   ￿! Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005, p. 6) are relatively upbeat about ALMP’s ability to cut 
unemployment, citing macro-studies by Scarpetta 1996, Nickell, 1997, and Elmeskov et al., 1998, and the 
microeconometric studies summarized in Martin 2000. 
   ! We have done so in unreported regressions on the 22 fixed country effects (21 countries minus the base 
country, but with different effects for Germany before and after 1990). The same UFO regressions should 
have more power when there are more fixed place effects, as in inter-state regression analyses of the fifty 
United States.   
   !￿ For fuller evidence on these effects, see Lindert 2004, especially Chapter 10. 
   !￿￿ The 19 countries are those listed in the notes to Table 2, minus Portugal and Spain, for whom we lack 
data on social transfers.  The earlier sample also lacks the OECD index of product-market regulations.   
   !￿￿￿ The differences in structure make it unwise to combine the whole 1963-2001 era into a single sample, 
unless one can cleverly specify equations that capture the structural evolution. 
   ￿  For alternative specifications over both historical samples, see Lindert 2004, Volume 2, Appendix E. 
 ￿  See the studies in Heckman and Pagés 2004. 
 ￿ ￿ Montenegro and Pagés 2004. 
 ￿ ￿￿ Gonzaga 2003.  In Brazil’s case, the rise in dismissal costs lowered turnover within a policy system that 
generated fake layoffs and a labor turnover rate as high as any in the world.  It is therefore possible that by 
reducing Brazil’s turnover rate, the 1988 Constitution and the 2001 law raised the productivity of 
privileged insiders enough to outweigh the productivity losses to outsiders, who had high turnover in any 
case.  Our text here emphasizes the clearer point:  Raising dismissal costs favored men’s jobs over jobs for 
women and youths.   
 ￿ ￿￿￿ Besley and Burgess 2004. 
 ￿ ￿! Fallon and Lucas 1991. 
 ￿ ! Lindbeck and Snower 2001. 
 ￿ !￿ The econometric analogy to a preponderance of evidence verdict is Xavier Sala-i-Martin’s acceptance 
of confidence interval verdicts from repeated trials instead of stricter interpretations of “robustness.” (Sala-
i-Martin 1997). Table 1. Sets of Second-Stage Equations to Explain Employment, Unemployment,




Employment ratio, 15-64 population Dep Tables 2, 5
Employment ratio, 15-64 women Dep
Unemployment rate, overall Dep
Unemployment rate, women/men Dep Table 3
Unemployment rate, youth/men Dep Table 3
Productivity and GDP outcomes
ln (GDP per person employed) Dep Tables 2, 5
ln (GDP per labor hour) Dep Tables 2, 5
ln (GDP per person 15-64) Dep Tables 2, 5
ln(GDP per capita) Dep
3-year log growth rate, GDP per capita Dep Tables 2, 5
Basic control variables
Dependent variable, lagged 3 years X*
ln(GDP per cap./US GDP per cap.), 10 yr. lag X X
Educational attainments of adults X X
Young (0-15 share) X X
Old (share 65 and up) X X
Global demand shocks (OECD infl. - unem.) X X
Global supply shocks (OECD infl. + unem.) X X
Institutional forces
Product-market regulations in seven sectors X X (Post-1978 sample only)
Internationally open policies (Freedom House) X X
Employee protection laws (EPL)
12 years ago X X
Change from 12 years ago to 6 years ago X X
Change from 6 years ago to current X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
12 years ago, interacted with levels of coord. X X
Coordinated wage-setting is intermediate X X
Coordinated wage-setting is strong X X
Budgetary policies
Unemployment comp. (& squared & cubed) X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
Total taxes/GDP (& squared & cubed) X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
Income & property tax share of total taxes X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
Consumption tax share of total taxes X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
Social transfer share of total taxes X & IV X & IV (IVs in Tables 2, 5)
Fixed-country binaries** s s Table 4
Fixed-time binaries s s
Notes to Table 1:* = For the female and youth rates of employment and unemployment, the lagged "dependent"
variable is the lagged overall rate, not the rate specific to women or youth.  
** For Germany, there are two different binary-variable "fixed countries": 
West Germany up through 1989, then all Germany from 1990 on.  
Dep = Dependent variable, to be explained in one of this set of equations.
X = An exogenous variable used in all variations of this equation.
IV = A predicted value based on instruments in a first-stage OLS equation.  
s =  An exogenous variable used in some variants of this equation, not others.
The sample is a balanced panel of 21 OECD countries times three-year time periods.
The 21 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany (West to 1989, all Germany 1990 on), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and USA. However, Spain and Portugal were omitted from the pre-1980 sample, for want
of OECD measures of social transfer spending.  
The three-year time periods are 1978/80-1999/2001 (so that n = 21 * 8 periods = 168),
1963/1965-1978/1980 (so that n = 19 * 6 periods = 114), and in some non-displayed
variants, the whole period 1963/1965-1999/2001 (n = 19 * 13 = 247).
Employment ratio = employment divided by the 15-64 population.
EPL = an index (0-5) of the strictness of employee protection laws, updated from (Allard 2003).  
Coordinated wage setting = an index from 1 to 3, from Ochel 2000, with 1999 values extended 
through 2001. An intermediate level of wage coordination was any Ochel rating between
2.0 and 2.5, inclusively.  A strong level of wage coordination was any case with the 
rating = 3.0. (There were no cases between 2.5 and 3.0.)
For a sketch of the first-stage equations generating the predicted values from instruments,
see Appendix A. These refer only to the Instrumental Variable (IV) variants, of course.  
For data sources, see (Allard 2003) and the Excel table "OECD annual 1950-2001," 
forthcoming on our internet sites.  
 Table 2. The Three-Year Effects of Selected Institutional Changes on Jobs and GDP, 1978-2001
The percentage estimated effects on --
GDP per GDP per GDP per 3-year growth rate
Institutional changes (independent variables) Jobs worker hour person 15-64 of GDP per capita
Market regulations --
Raising the index of product-market regulations by 1 -0.06 -1.23 ** -1.13 ** -2.16 ** 0.30
#### (0.45) (0.36) (0.74) (0.40)
Tightening employee protection laws (EPLs), by 1 index point for 12 years or more
(a) with little or no wage-setting coordination -0.66 1.70 a 1.66 ** -1.26 0.51
#### (0.90) (0.67) (1.42) (0.91)
(b) with close coordination in wage-setting -0.52 -6.06 ** -3.50 ** -5.16 * -3.66 **
#### (1.50) (1.13) (2.49) (1.45)
Shifting the index of coordinated wage-setting from no wage coordination to high
(a) with weak EPLs 2.92 22.62 ** 15.31 ** 20.64 ** 14.70 **
#### (3.09) (2.79) (4.92) (2.83)
(b) with strict EPLs 3.39 -4.14 -1.87 6.47 0.59
#### (2.76) (1.75) (4.78) (2.78)
The double jump, both from low (0.4) to high (3.5) 1.33 5.59 * 6.18 ** 5.14 4.70 b
EPL and from no wage coordination to high #### (2.54) (1.76) (4.09) (2.60)
Fiscal wedges in the labor market --
Raising the unemployment compens. support ratio
• from 0% (e.g. Italy 1979) to 1% -0.20 -0.39 a -0.05 -0.82 * -0.18
#### (0.22) (0.19) (0.34) (0.22)
• from 15% (e.g. France 1982) to 16% 0.04 -0.06 0.12 b -0.10 0.03
#### (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07)
• from 30% (e.g. Belgium 1982) to 31% -0.25 * -0.10 0.19 -0.28 -0.15
#### (0.16) (0.12) (0.22) (0.14)Table 2, continued
The percentage estimated effects on --
GDP per GDP per GDP per 3-year growth rate
Broader fiscal shifts -- Jobs worker hour person 15-64 of GDP per capita
Raising all taxes and transfers in proportion
• taxes up from 27% of GDP (USA) to 28% 0.13 0.35 b -0.16 0.36 0.62 **
#### (0.20) (0.16) (0.33) (0.21)
• taxes up from 35% of GDP (Italy 1985) to 36% -0.01 0.33 ** 0.37 ** 0.29 b 0.09
#### (0.10) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11)
• taxes up from 45% of GDP (Belgium 1985) to 46% 0.20 -0.10 -0.44 ** 0.61 * 0.06
#### (0.15) (0.10) (0.27) (0.15)
Raising taxes and spending them only on extra transfers
• taxes up from 27% of GDP (USA) to 28% 0.17 0.37 -0.20 0.56 0.57 *
#### (0.25) (0.20) (0.41) (0.26)
• taxes up from 35% of GDP (Italy 1985) to 36% 0.03 0.34 * 0.33 * 0.44 b 0.05
#### (0.17) (0.13) (0.25) (0.18)
• taxes up from 45% of GDP (Belgium 1985) to 46% 0.22 -0.09 -0.46 ** 0.71 * 0.04
#### (0.17) (0.12) (0.30) (0.17)
Coefficient on the lagged dependent variable# 0.98 ** 0.86 ** 0.89 ** 0.76 **
#### (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)Notes and sources to Table 2:
(Standard errors in parentheses.  ** = significant at the 1% level (two-tail).  * = significant at the 5% level.
a = significant at the 7% level; b = significant at the 10% level.)
# To compute eventual steady-state impacts, multiply the (logged) 3-year coefficients by 1/(1 - this coefficient). 
For the structures of the equations, see the sketch in Table 1 and the details in the Appendices. 
"Jobs" here = the ratio of employed persons to the adult population of working age (15-64).
Min, mean, max of its natural log = -0.78, -0.43, -0.16.  
Productivity per worker = real GDP per employed person. Min, mean, max of its natural log = 9.9, 10.57, 11.1.
Productivity per hour = GDP per labor hour.  Min, mean, max of its natural log = 9.9, 10.55, 11.0.
Product market regulation = an index of the degree of regulatory intervention in product markets. 
Min, mean, max = 1.00, 4.1455, 5.98.
The index of strictness of employment protection laws (EPLs) ranges from 0 to 5.  See Allard (2003). 
Min, mean, max = 0.10, 2.09, 3.83. Here "weak" EPLs = an index of 0.4 (USA), and "strict" = an index of 3.5 (Italy).
The index of collective wage setting ranges from 1 to 3, and is from Ocher (2000).  Min, mean, max = 1.0, 1.98, 3.0.
Here "little or no coordination" = 1 and "close coordination" = 3.
The overall generosity and use of compensation to the unemployed is the Allard "net reservation wage."
More specifically, it is measured as the product of 
(a) the marginal “replacement rate,” or (benefits per recipient) divided by (market wage), net of taxes;
(b) the coverage rate, the share of unemployed persons who are eligible; and
(c) the duration of coverage over the first year.
Welfare-state social transfers as a share of GDP include public pensions, public health, unemployment
compensation, family assistance, and public housing.  Min, mean, max = 7.64%, 20.50%, 32.80%.
The variants shown here exclude non-human capital formation from the set of regressors, implicitly
endogenizing capital formation and the capital stock.  
The equation for GDP per person 15-64 is estimated directly, not derived from the 
by the employment and productivity estimates shown in the earlier columns.
All equations displayed here have highly significant F statistics.  Table 3. The Three-Year Effects of Selected Institutional Changes
On the Relative Unemployment of Women and Young Adults, 1978-2001
The estimated effects on --
Female/ male unemploy- Youth (15-24) unemployment /
Institutional changes (independent variables) ment, among those 15-64 unemployment among males 15-64
Market regulations --
Raising the index of product-market regulations by 1 0.065 (0.024) ** #### (0.05) **
Tightening employee protection laws (EPLs), by 1 index point for 12 years or more
(a) with little or no wage-setting coordination 0.197 (0.052) ** 0.482 (0.10) **
(b) with close coordination in wage-setting 0.288 (0.101) ** 0.420 (0.13) **
Shifting the index of coordinated wage-setting from no wage coordination to high
(a) with weak EPLs #### (0.232) * 0.085 (0.28)
(b) with strict EPLs #### (0.124) a #### (0.22) b
The double jump, both from low (0.4) to high (3.5) 0.282 (0.148) a 1.328 (0.30) **
EPL and from no wage coordination to high (from 1.0 to 3.0)
Fiscal wedges in the labor market --
Raising the unemployment compensation support ratio
• from 0% (e.g. Italy 1979) to 1% #### (0.016) ** #### (0.03) **
• from 15% (e.g. France 1982) to 16% #### (0.006) * #### (0.01) **
• from 30% (e.g. Belgium 1982) to 31% 0.015 (0.012) #### (0.04) **The estimated effects on --
Table 3, continued Female/ male unemploy- Youth (15-24) unemployment /
ment, among those 15-64 unemployment among males 15-64
Broader fiscal shifts --
Raising all taxes and transfers in proportion
• taxes up from 27% of GDP (USA) to 28% 0.016 (0.014) 0.095 (0.03) **
• taxes up from 35% of GDP (Italy 1985) to 36% #### (0.008) b 0.043 (0.01) **
• taxes up from 45% of GDP (Belgium 1985) to 46%#### (0.010) * 0.023 (0.02)
 
Raising taxes and spending them only on extra transfers
• from 27% of GDP (USA) to 28% 0.033 (0.018) a 0.077 (0.03) *
• from 35% of GDP (Italy 1985) to 36% #### (0.011) 0.030 (0.02)
• from 45% of GDP (Belgium 1985) to 46% #### (0.011) 0.014 (0.02)
Coefficient on the lagged ln(employ't ratio), 15-64s #### (0.238) ** #### (0.37) **
Notes and sources to Table 3:
(Standard errors in parentheses.  ** = significant at the 1% level (two-tail).  * = significant at the 5% level.
a = significant at the 7% level; b = significant at the 10% level.)
The female/male ratio of unemployment rates in the 15-64 age range has a 21-country (min, average, max) = (0.57, 1.35, 2.88).
The youth/men unemployment ratio has sample (min, average, max) = (1.1, 2.31, 5.4).  Its sample consists of 14 countries:
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA.
For the structures of the equations, see the sketch in Table 1 and the details in the Appendix.  
The other notes to Table 2 also apply here.   
Table 4. Employee Protection Laws Redistribute Unemployment  
    toward Outsiders: Four Countries in 2002 
 
          Ratios of unemployment rates 
      EPL    Youth 15-24    Women 25-64  
           strictness  /men 25-64    /men 25-64 
Greece     3.8    4.2      2.4 
Italy      3.3    3.8      1.8 
  versus 
Ireland     1.3    1.7      0.8 




Source: SourceOECD, standardized unemployment rates. Table 5.  What's Hiding Inside the Conventional Unidentified
Fixed-Country Effects (UFOs) for 1978-2001?
Correlations of these regression-based fixed country effects …
… with 1978-2001 averages by ln(employ- ln(GDP per ln(GDP per ln(GDP per log-growth
country for these variables ment ratio) employed) labor hour) person 15-64) of GDP/capita
Market regulations
Product market regulations -0.16 0.47 -0.03 0.24 0.34
EPL strictness now 0.11 0.50 -0.05 0.44 0.43
EPL strictness 12 years ago 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.42 0.39
Wage-setting coordination (Ochel) 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.52
Overall budget variables
Total taxes / GDP (see Fig. 3) 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.86 0.68
Income and property tax / all taxes -0.11 -0.70 -0.08 -0.54 -0.57
Consumption taxes / all taxes -0.27 0.21 0.19 0.04 -0.06
Social transfers / total taxes 0.38 0.50 0.30 0.53 0.55
Labor-specific budget variables
The "tax wedge" on labor earnings 0.43 0.77 0.47 0.80 0.72
Generosity of unemployment compensation 0.36 0.30 0.56 0.41 0.39
ALMP support ratio 0.80 0.16 0.20 0.55 0.37
Other conditioning variables
Educational attainment, in years 0.33 -0.47 0.10 -0.11 -0.41
Shadow economy / GDP in 1989 -0.29 0.22 -0.13 0.07 -0.02
Notes: Boldface = The column's top three correlations (in absolute value).
The fixed country effects for each column come from regressions described in connection with Tables 1 and 2.  While these
came from the instrumented equations, those from uninstrumented equations give similar results.  
There are 22 fixed country effects.  These are for the 21 countries (USA = 0), but with German averages split into two
countries: West German averages for 1978-1989, and all-German averages for 1990-2001.Table 6. The Three-Year Effects of Selected Institutional Changes on Jobs and GDP, 1963-1980
The percentage estimated effects on -- 3-year growth
GDP per GDP per GDP per rate of GDP
Institutional changes (independent variables) Jobs worker hour person 15-64 per capita
Market regulations --
Tightening employee protection laws (EPLs), by 1 index point for 12 years or more
(a) with little or no wage-setting coordination-2.25 2.30 -1.58 1.03 -0.64
(1.45) (1.51) (1.32) (2.33) (1.57)
(b) with close coordination in wage-setting 2.66 ** 1.00 0.27 4.89 ** 2.46 a
(1.13) (1.24) (1.17) (1.85) (1.34)
Shifting the index of coordinated wage-setting from no wage coordination to high
(a) with weak EPLs -0.02 0.55 1.03 -0.13 -1.03
(1.61) (2.09) (2.10) (2.78) (2.18)
(b) with strict EPLs 8.99 * 2.96 7.02 b 12.17 a 8.89 a
(3.78) (4.28) (4.15) (6.12) (4.52)
The double jump, both from low (0.4) to high (3.5) 6.44 * 3.16 1.07 12.98 ** 4.91
EPL and from no wage coordination to high (3.13) (3.04) (2.74) (4.58) (3.30)
Fiscal wedges in the labor market --
Raising the unemployment compens. support ratio
• from 0% (e.g. Switzerland, Italy 1973) to 1%0.82 * 0.99 * 1.06 * 1.99 ** 0.58
(0.40) (0.49) (0.43) (0.64) (0.50)
• from 10% (e.g. Denmark 1973) to 11% -0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.16 0.29 b
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.16)
• from 20% (e.g. Belgium 1973) to 21% 0.16 0.02 -0.27 0.01 -0.24
(0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.29) (0.24)Table 2, continued
Broader fiscal shifts --
Raising all taxes and transfers in proportion
• taxes up from 22% of GDP (Japan 1973) to 23% -0.04 -0.98 ** -1.15 ** -1.09 ** -1.29 **
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.36) (0.27)
• taxes up from 30% of GDP (Belgium 1964) to 31% -0.26 * -0.17 -0.10 -0.53 * 0.03
(0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17)
• taxes up from 40% of GDP (Austria 1979) to 41% -0.26 -0.66 * -0.59 * -1.34 ** -0.84 *
(0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.47) (0.34)
Raising taxes and spending them only on extra transfers
• taxes up from 22% of GDP to 23% -0.23 -0.71 * -0.60 * -0.86 a -1.13 **
(0.27) (0.30) (0.25) (0.44) (0.33)
• taxes up from 30% of GDP to 31% -0.37 * -0.01 0.22 -0.40 0.12
(0.16) (0.23) (0.22) (0.30) (0.24)
• taxes up from 40% of GDP to 41% -0.33 -0.57 a -0.40 -1.25 ** -0.78 *
(0.26) (0.30) (0.28) (0.46) (3.35)
Coefficient on the lagged dependent variable# 0.86 ** 0.96 ** 0.95 ** 0.90 **
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Notes and sources to Table 6:
(Standard errors in parentheses.  ** = significant at the 1% level (two-tail).  * = significant at the 5% level.
a = significant at the 7% level; b = significant at the 10% level.)
For the structures of the equations, see the sketch in Table 1 and the details in the Appendix.  
The other notes to Table 2 also apply here.       
APPENDIX A. The First-Stage Equations  
Used in the Instrumental-Variable Variants 
 
  For the instrumented-variable variants of the second-stage equations featured in 
Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6, we chose first-stage instruments in a two-part procedure designed to 
exclude groups of instruments that failed to add significant power to the first-stage 
prediction of the potentially endogenous institutional and fiscal variables.   
  First, we gave the broadest possible set of independent variables suggested by 
theory, and began pruning insignificant sets of instruments.  Of the variables that 
survived this pruning process, some overlap with the second-stage regressors.  This is 
generally undesirable, yet such variables were kept in the set of instruments here on the 
grounds that they really did affect some of the endogenous institutional variables.   
  The second part of the first-stage was the actual OLS estimation based on the 
narrower set of instruments that survived the pruning process.  The predicted values from 
these estimates were used in the IV variants of the second stage.   
  As a possible alternative for purging cyclical effects from the endogenous fiscal 
variables, we also experimented with extracting a cyclical component tied to 
unemployment and inflation, in the spirit of many authors’ calculations of full-
employment budget surpluses.  This failed to make any difference to the estimates.  
Whichever variant was tried, there was still a cyclical and transitory component of the 
budget variables (taxes and transfers), which behaved quite differently from the more 
permanent component.  As explained in the text, separating these two helps the equations 
to answer the basic question about the effects of sustained institutional shifts.  
  In the first part, or first regression pass, of the first-stage estimation, we used an 
over-broad set of regressions to predict the following potentially endogenous institutional 
and policy variables:  (1) EPL strictness; (2) the “net reservation wage” offered to the 
unemployed; (3) the degree of wage coordination; (4) the active labor market policy 
(ALMP) support ratio, which equals (unemployment benefits per unemployed) / (GDP 
per person in the labor force); (5) the country’s openness to international transactions, 
measured by Freedom House’s Index 4; (6) income and property taxes as a share of GDP; (7) social security contributions from payroll, as a share of GDP; (8) taxes on goods and 
services as a share of GDP; (9) social transfers as a share of GDP; (10) total taxes as a 
share of GDP; and (11) the tax wedge on labor earnings. 
  The over-broad set of potential instruments included: 
 
(a) a binary variable for a politically conservative regime;  
(b) the share of adults who voted in the last general election, and itself squared and cubed; 
(c) military spending as a share of GDP;  
(d) membership in a customs union or free trade area; 
(e) share of public sector in employment; 
(f) log of national population in millions;  
(g) share of population that is younger than 15, and the same share squared and cubed;  
(h) share of population that is 65 or older, and the same share squared and cubed; 
(i) primary and secondary school enrollment rate ten years earlier;  
(j) university enrollment rate 10 years earlier;  
(k) employee protection law strictness lagged 9 years, and its changes of the subsequent 6 years; 
(j) the lagged "net reservation wage" (Allard 2003) received after taxes by the average 
unemployed nine years earlier, and its changes of the subsequent 6 years; 
(k) an index of centralized wage bargaining, and its lagged values of the preceding nine years;  
(l) dummies for each three-year time period (except the last period in the sample); and 
(m) dummies for each country except for the United States.  An exception:  Separate dummy 
variables were used for West Germany before 1991 and for unified Germany thereafter. 
 
  Next came the pruning process, to exclude groups of variables that did not prove 
significant in the initial regressions run on this over-broad list of potential instruments.  
In all equations, the binary variable for politically conservative regime added no 
explanatory power and was pruned altogether.  Here is an equation-by-equation listing of 
other variables that got pruned from the first-stage equations: 
 
Equation (1), predicting EPL strictness – The strictness of employee protection laws was 
driven largely by its own earlier values. It was practically an exogenous variable subject 
to a random walk.  Still, to explore what difference it would make to endogenize EPL, we 
ran an equation to predict EPL without these variables: the military spending share of 
GDP, the public-sector employment share, membership in a customs union or free trade 
area, the child share, the old share, the fixed-time dummies, and the levels of wage 
coordination. 
 
Equation (2), predicting the net reservation wage, our measure of the generosity of offers 
of unemployment compensation – We dropped the military spending share, the public-
sector job share, membership in a customs union or free trade area, lagged school 
enrollments, lagged university enrollments, and the log of total population.  
Eq. (3), income and property tax as a share of GDP: Most instruments played a 
significant role.  The only ones dropped were the military share, the public sector’s share 
of employment, and the school enrollment ratio. 
   
Equation (4) for commodity taxation as a share of GDP, we dropped military spending, 
the public sector share of employment, log of total population, the child (0-15) share of 
the population, and the lagged net reservation wage.   
 
Equation (5), social transfers as a share of GDP -- We dropped the log of population and 
the wage coordination variables.  The voting share was a strong determinant of social 
transfers, here as in Lindert (2004).   
     
Equation (6) Total taxes as a share of GDP – In this case, we dropped the military share, 
the lagged school enrollment rate, the child (0-15) share, the elderly (over 65) share, and 
the lagged rates of unemployment compensation.   
 
Equation (7) The OECD’s publicized tax wedge as a share of labor earnings – This was 
unavailable for early years.  For the later sample, it usually showed negative influences 
on jobs and productivity, as one would expect.  For this study, it has been dropped in 
favor of the larger total-tax aggregate that includes it. 
 
  We omitted any equation predicting either wage coordination (linear version of 
the index) or the binaries indicating whether the index was in the intermediate or high 
coordination class. The wage coordination variables were left exogenous, since no 
instruments other than fixed country effects predicted them well.   
   
  In the case of the active labor market policy (ALMP) support ratio, this whole 
variable had to be omitted from the second stage, even though we have data on it for most 
countries after 1980.  Trying to include it, either with or without instrumenting, yielded 
fragile and often implausible results.  The underlying problem is that the cyclical 
determinants of this support ratio, or of ALMP expenditures as a simple share of GDP, 
are too powerful. They yield highly sensitive results, even when this support ratio is 
estimated with only those instruments that should not have been very cyclical.  In some 
variants, ALMP was wildly sensitive to GDP.  We have to leave this variable out, relying 
on continuing micro-based research to determine its role.   
 
  Openness to trade, like ALMP, runs the risk of being highly endogenous and 
responsive to the business cycle, especially if it is measured as trade shares of GDP.  We 
seek only the policy component of openness, and chose the Freedom House indicator of 
how open are government and the law to international transactions.  This was not easily 
instrumented, and was viewed as exogenous.   
 APPENDIX B.   FULL REGRESSIONS BEHIND FOUR EQUATIONS OF TABLE 2
(n = 168) Dependent variable:  Jobs: ln (employment Productivity: ln (GDP
per person 15-64) per employed person)
Independent variables coefficient Std. error coefficient Std. error
Dependent variable, lagged 3 years 0.976 (0.027) 0.864 (0.023)
Low-GDP history # 0.0014 (0.027) 0.0041 (0.034)
Educational attainments of adults -0.0053 (0.0029) -0.0017 (0.0036)
Young (0-15 share) -0.0067 (0.0018) 0.0019 (0.0019)
Old (share 65 and up) -0.0068 (0.0025) -0.0046 (0.0028)
Global demand shocks (OECD infl. - unem.) 0.011 (0.002) 0.014 (0.0020)
    "   times (this is USA) 0.034 (0.016) 0.051 (0.020)
Global supply shocks (OECD infl. + unem.) -0.0084 (0.0013) -0.013 (0.0014)
    "   times (this is USA) -0.014 (0.011) -0.041 (0.015)
Product-market regulations in seven sectors -0.0006 (0.0034) -0.012 (0.0045)
Internat'ly open policies (Freedom House) -0.0033 (0.0039) -0.0022 (0.005)
EPL change, 6 years ago to current -0.0079 (0.010) 0.017 (0.013)
EPL change, 12 years ago to 6 years ago -0.012 (0.007) 0.0086 (0.0094)
EPL level 12 years ago -0.0066 (0.0075) 0.017 (0.009)
    "  times intermediate wage-setting coord. -0.0029 (0.0052) (0.0001) (0.0062)
    "  times strong wage-setting coord. 0.0015 (0.015) -0.079 (0.017)
Unemployment comp., country average -0.216 (0.225) -0.413 (0.230)
Unemployment comp., departure from ave. -0.155 (0.239) -0.268 (0.255)
Unemployment comp., squared 1.745 (1.373) 1.800 (1.503)
Unemployment comp., cubed -3.931 (2.493) -2.806 (2.872)
Coordinated wage-setting is intermediate 0.0008 (0.012) 0.012 (0.014)
Coordinated wage-setting is strong 0.028 (0.030) 0.236 (0.037)
Total taxes/GDP, country average 0.026 (0.029) -0.018 (0.033)
Taxes/GDP, departure from country average 0.027 (0.029) -0.018 (0.033)
Taxes/GDP, squared -0.00074 (0.0008) 0.00069 (0.0009)
Taxes/GDP, cubed / 1000 0.00695 (0.0071) -0.00748 (0.0081)
Income tax share of all tax, country average 0.032 (0.033) 0.086 (0.040)
    "   , departure from country average 0.044 (0.088) 0.434 (0.115)
Commodity tax share of all tax, country ave. 0.037 (0.054) -0.194 (0.069)
    "   , departure from country average 0.163 (0.116) 0.212 (0.138)
Transfers share of all tax, country ave. 0.024 (0.056) 0.010 (0.065)
    "   , departure from country average -0.088 (0.062) -0.184 (0.065)
Constant -0.041 (0.324) 1.675 (0.473)Mean of dependent variable -0.428 10.578
# Low-GDP history = ln (US GDP per cap. / this country's GDP per cap.), 10 years earlier.
(For choices of IV's, see Table 1 and Appendix A.)
APPENDIX B.   FULL REGRESSIONS BEHIND TABLE 2, continued
(n = 168) Dependent variable:  Output: ln (GDP Growth: 3-year change
per person 15-64) in log (GDP per capita)
Independent variables coefficient Std. error coefficient Std. error
Dependent variable, lagged 3 years 0.757 (0.042)
Low-GDP history # -0.031 (0.055) 0.096 (0.032)
Educational attainments of adults -0.0027 0.0055 -0.0012 0.0035
Young (0-15 share) -0.0086 0.0032 -0.0006 0.0018
Old (share 65 and up) -0.015 0.0045 -0.0049 0.0028
Global demand shocks (OECD infl. - unem.) 0.026 0.0032 0.0149 0.0020
    "   times (this is USA) 0.068 (0.032) 0.066 (0.022)
Global supply shocks (OECD infl. + unem.) -0.024 (0.0023) -0.014 (0.0013)
    "   times (this is USA) -0.073 (0.024) -0.041 (0.017)
Product-market regulations in seven sectors -0.022 (0.0074) 0.0030 (0.0040)
Internat'ly open policies (Freedom House) -0.013 (0.0075) -0.0018 (0.0053)
EPL change, 6 years ago to current -0.0019 (0.019) -0.0021 (0.0128)
EPL change, 12 years ago to 6 years ago -0.023 (0.014) 0.0091 (0.0094)
EPL level 12 years ago -0.013 (0.014) 0.0051 (0.0091)
    "  times intermediate wage-setting coord. 0.0089 0.0092 0.0006 (0.0064)
    "  times strong wage-setting coord. -0.040 (0.027) -0.042 (0.016)
Unemployment comp., country average -0.864 (0.364) -0.189 (0.232)
Unemployment comp., departure from ave. -0.636 (0.400) -0.073 (0.258)
Unemployment comp., squared 4.039 (2.281) 1.389 (1.465)
Unemployment comp., cubed -6.725 (4.249) -2.906 (2.702)
Coordinated wage-setting is intermediate -0.0047 (0.021) 0.0049 (0.015)
Coordinated wage-setting is strong 0.204 (0.058) 0.154 (0.034)
Total taxes/GDP, country average 0.029 (0.053) 0.058 (0.034)
Taxes/GDP, departure from country average 0.029 (0.053) 0.055 (0.033)
Taxes/GDP, squared -0.0008 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0009
Taxes/GDP, cubed / 1000 0.0077 0.0131 0.0117 0.0082
Income tax share of all tax, country average 0.075 (0.061) 0.096 (0.039)
    "   , departure from country average 0.691 (0.179) 0.323 (0.115)
Commodity tax share of all tax, country ave. -0.198 (0.104) -0.205 (0.074)    "   , departure from country average 0.478 (0.210) 0.317 (0.142)
Transfers share of all tax, country ave. 0.111 (0.099) -0.026 (0.070)
    "   , departure from country average -0.176 (0.103) -0.255 (0.068)
Constant 2.740 (0.743) -0.655 (0.370)
Mean of dependent variable 10.151 0.065
# Low-GDP history = ln(US GDP per cap./this country's GDP per cap.), 10 years earlier.
(For choices of IV's, see Table 1 and Appendix A.)